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Asymmetries in the Euro area economy 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 9/2004 





Using quarterly data for the period since 1987 this paper explores, in the context 
of a small model of the EU economy, the degree to which monetary policy has 
been asymmetric. It shows in particular that monetary policy has been much more 
responsive to threats that inflation would lie outside the price stability target than 
to equal sized shocks within the target zone. Similarly monetary policy has 
responded to threats of large positive and negative output gaps but has remained 
largely unresponsive to smaller divergences. It thus appears that the ECB and its 
predecessors have been avoiding ‘fine-tuning’ but have been aggressive in 
responding to substantial threats to macroeconomic stability. The action seems to 
have been stronger with respect to inflationary pressure than to deflation but this 
may offset any bias in fiscal policy. The asymmetric response of policy in part 
reflects considerable non-linearities and asymmetries in the behaviour of the euro 
area economies. High unemployment has relatively limited effect in pulling 
inflation down while low unemployment can be much more effective in driving it 
up. Economic downturns are both more rapid and sustained in driving 
unemployment up than recoveries are in bringing it down. There is considerable 
variety in these relationships and IS curves across countries, sectors and regions. 
Monetary policy reacts in the light of this. 
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JEL classification numbers: E52, E61  
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Epäsymmetriat euroalueen taloudessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 9/2004 





Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan rahapolitiikan epäsymmetrisyyttä tukeutuen 
analyyseissä pieneen EU-talouden malliin, joka on estimoitu vuoden 1987 jälkei-
selle ajanjaksolle. Ilmenee, että rahapolitiikka on reagoinut voimakkaammin inf-
laatiouhkaan, joka on ollut hintavakaustavoiteregiimin ulkopuolella kuin saman-
suuruisiin inflaatiosokkeihin tavoiteregiimin sisällä. Samaten rahapolitiikka on 
reagoinut suurten positiivisten tai negatiivisten tuotantokuilujen uhkaan, mutta 
jäänyt verraten passiiviseksi pienten poikkeamien suhteen. Siten näyttää siltä, että 
EKP ja sen edeltäjät ovat välttäneet niin sanottua hienosäätöä, mutta olleet sen 
sijaan aggressiivisia reagoidessaan suuriin makrotaloudellisen tasapainon uhkiin. 
Toimet näyttävät olleen voimakkaampia inflaatiopaineisiin kuin deflaatiopainei-
siin, mutta tämä saattaa vain korvata finanssipolitiikan mahdollisen erilaisen pai-
notuksen. Epäsymmetrinen reagointi osaltaan heijastaa epälineaarisuuksia ja epä-
symmetrioita euroalueen talouksissa. Suuri työttömyys vaikuttaa verraten vähän 
inflaation hillinnässä, kun taas vähäinen työttömyys selvästi kiihdyttää inflaatiota. 
Taloudelliset laskusuhdanteet näkyvät välittömämmin ja pysyvämmin työttömyy-
den kasvuna kuin noususuhdanteet työttömyyden vähentymisenä. Näitä ja IS-käy-
riin liittyviä riippuvuuksia on huomattavan suuri kirjo eri maissa, eri sektoreilla ja 
eri alueilla. Rahapolitiikan reaktiot selittyvät näiden erojen kautta. 
 
Avainsanat: rahapolitiikka, epäsymmetria, Taylorin sääntö, epälineaarisuus 
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All economies face problems of aggregation in running macroeconomic policy. If 
economic behaviour can be approximated reasonably by a linear representation 
then however diverse the economic structure, regional and industry performance, 
aggregation remains a second order issue. The consequences for each region or 
industry of single economy-wide policy, such as monetary policy, will however 
be drastically different if the economy is very diverse. This will pose problems for 
redistribution of income and wealth, migration, regional, industrial and other 
policies aimed at addressing the consequences for those differentially affected. If 
behaviour is both nonlinear and asymmetric, it becomes much more difficult to 
determine the appropriate single policy. 
  In most mature economies this potential problem is relatively little studied, in 
part perhaps because policymakers readily allow for it and partly because the 
offsetting redistributive measures are extensive and automatic. The problem is 
thus less visible ex post. In the euro area on the other hand there was little 
experience of running a single monetary policy before 1999, yet there was a great 
deal of information and experience at the member state level. The nature of the 
aggregation process has thus been much more obvious as has the diversity among 
the component economies.
1 Furthermore since there is little redistribution across 
national borders the divergent consequences are also more obvious. However, 
while the extent of the variation in behaviour is well known,
2 euro area policy 
simulations have typically been conducted with models that use euro level 
aggregated data or which handle the euro countries separately (with appropriate 
cross-country constraints) and aggregate the results.
3 Such aggregations are 
usually either unweighted or based on GDP or similar weights. 
  In this paper we show that there are strong grounds for believing that there are 
considerable asymmetries and nonlinearities in inflationary behaviour and 
monetary transmission. Ignoring these could have substantial adverse effects on 
particular sectors, regions and member states within the euro area. In section 3 we 
develop a small conventional model of the monetary transmission mechanism in 
the euro area and show in section 4, using a dataset that covers all of the EU 
                                       
1 As an illustration of the variation across the member states of the euro area, inflation varied 
between 2.5 percent and 0.6 percent in 1999, GDP growth between 8.3 and 1.4 percent and the 
share of exports between 0.84 and 0.24. 
2 Dornbusch et al (1998), Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), Obstfeld and Peri (1998) for example. 
3 The Bank of Finland’s EDGE model (Kortelainen, 2000) and ECB’s AWM (Fagan et al, 2001) 
follow the first approach and the NIESR NiGEM, the European Commission’s QUEST II, and the 
Netherlands Bank’s EUROMON the second, for example.  
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countries except Greece and Luxembourg,
4 that there are good empirical grounds 
for asymmetry and/or nonlinearity in each of the relationships. In section 5 we 
show how these results pose problems for aggregation. Section 6 concludes but 
we begin, in section 2, by explaining how we use the term asymmetry and 
motivate the rest of the discussion. 
 
 
2  The nature of asymmetry 
Before we go any further we need to sort out what is meant by asymmetry, as 
there is no commonly accepted definition. Sorting out nonlinearity is a simpler 
task as we take it here to refer to relationships that are curvilinear or have 
different parameter values over different ranges, rather than exhibiting 
discontinuities or chaotic behaviour.  
  In the European context the most common use of the word ‘asymmetric’ 
merely means ‘different’. The simplest example comes in the concept of 
asymmetric shocks, which are just shocks that affect one part of the economy 
rather than another. Secondly, asymmetry is commonly used to refer to 
relationships where there are omitted variables or even omitted secondary 
equations. We show in Section 4 that there is one source of ‘asymmetry’ in this 
sense in the Okun curve. Namely that the dispersion of unemployment rates 
across the euro area affects the impact that the rate of economic growth has on 
unemployment rates. Similarly, Gaiotti and Generale (2001) and Loupias et al 
(2001) in showing that there is a credit channel for monetary policy describe this 
additional feature as ‘asymmetry’ in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
  Here we use asymmetry much more directly – that relationships are not 
symmetric in the sense of having the same coefficients either side of given value. 
Thus a relationship 
 
e y a a x 1 0 + + =  (2.1) 
 
is not symmetric if a1 ≠ a2 in 
 
e y a y a a x 2 1 0 + + + =
− +  (2.2) 
 
where y y =
−  when y  <  y
T (= 0 elsewhere) and  y y =
+  when y  ≥ y
T (=  0 
elsewhere). y
T is a ‘threshold’ value (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993; Tong, 1993). 
                                       
4 We thus cover not merely the current euro area but also the main countries that might join it over 
the coming few years. Data for Ireland are more limited and Greece and Luxembourg only 
excluded because data were not available.  
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A simple example would be the Phillips curve, where inflation responds 
differently depending upon whether the output gap is positive or negative. We can 
easily respecify x and y in first difference form (or first difference of logarithms) 
and show that for example the impact of changes in GDP on unemployment 
depend on whether the economy is growing or contracting.
5 
  We have deliberately made this asymmetry very simple but one could argue 
that while the cointegrating relationship is symmetric the error correction 
mechanism could be asymmetric (Harris and Silverstone (1999) and Huang et al 
(2001)). Thus, if â0 and â1 are the estimated values of a0 and a1 and ê = x – â0 – â1y 
the computed error, then the error correction process will be asymmetric if c2 ≠ c3 
in 
 




− 1 3 1 2 1 0 e ˆ c e ˆ c y c c x  (2.3) 
 
where ê
- = ê when ê < ê
T and ê
+ = ê when ê ≥ ê
T (= 0 elsewhere), ê
T being the 
‘threshold’ value.
6 
  Furthermore, one could assume that the distributions of errors or shocks are 
not symmetric, as is the case in frontier models (Mayes et al 1994). All of the 
above would constitute examples of asymmetry in the more restricted sense that 
we use it. 
  Much of the traditional treatment of asymmetry (Keynes, 1936; Diebold and 
Rudebusch, 1999) is concerned with the shape of the business cycle. Three 
characteristics of asymmetry in shape can be identified: deepness – do recessions 
tend to be deeper than booms are high (compared to some trend or sustainable 
growth path); length – do expansions tend to last longer than recessions and 
steepness – does the decline occur more rapidly than the recovery.
7 This 
asymmetry in outcome will tend to be a product of the asymmetries in 
relationships and shocks that we have identified. 
 
 
                                       
5 In a very recent paper Corrado and Holly (2003) try to estimate a general hyperbolic functional 
form for the Phillips curve. In practice, they end up by estimating two thresholds. Their results for 
the UK and the US suggest that the Phillips curve is steeper for larger positive output gaps than it 
is for larger negative gaps, while in the middle, for small positive and negative gaps, the curve is 
fairly flat. 
6 It is possible to specify the asymmetric adjustment process in terms of ∆ê, as in Huang et al 
(2001), using the M-TAR model of Enders and Siklos (2001), rather than the TAR model in terms 
of ê, described in (2.3). M stands for momentum. 
7 See Verbrugge (1998) for empirical evidence on these nonlinear properties in cross-country data.  
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3  A simple model 
In order to examine asymmetry we set up a simple and very conventional four 
equation model of the economy, consisting of an IS curve, a Phillips curve, and 
Okun curve and a monetary policy reaction function. Following Duguay (1994), 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000), the IS curve is of the form 
 
*
k t 5 j t 4 i t 3 2 t 2 1 t 1 0 t y a re a rr a y a y a a y − − − − − ∇ + + + ∇ + ∇ + = ∇  (3.1) 
 
where ∇y is the deviation of output y from its Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, rr is 
the real 3-month interest rate (ie the nominal rate of interest r less the annual rate 
of consumer price inflation ∆p), re the real exchange rate with the US dollar (in 
logs) and ∇y* the deviation of OECD output from its HP trend. (Lag lengths i, j 
and k typically vary from 1 to 3 quarters in estimation.) Equation (3.2) is a form 
of the expectations augmented Phillips curve 
 
u b * p b p b p b b p 4 3
e
2 1 t 1 0 + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ −  (3.2) 
 
p
e is expected inflation, p* is the foreign price (in domestic currency) and u is the 
deviation of unemployment from its trend.
8 A simple form of the Okun curve is 
 
pop c y c c U 2 1 0 ∆ + ∆ + = ∆  (3.3) 
 
where pop is the population of working age. Lastly we include a monetary 
reaction function in the form of a Taylor rule 
 
] y d ) p p ( d d )[ 1 ( r r t 2 t
T
1 0 1 t t ∇ + ∆ − ∆ + ρ − + ρ = −  (3.4) 
 
where the parameter ρ permits an element of interest rate smoothing and ∆p
T is 
the target for inflation (Huang et al 2001; Gerlach, 2000b). 
  This set of equations determines inflation, output, unemployment and the rate 
of interest. Foreign prices, foreign output and the exchange rate are treated as 
exogenous to the system. Data constraints lead us to modify (3.2) in some of the 




                                       
8 We use a more complex lag structure in estimation.  
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4  Aggregation, nonlinearity and asymmetry in the 
Euro area 
In the estimated version of (3.1) to (3.4) we use a panel of quarterly data for the 
period 1985.1 to 2001.3 for all the euro area countries except Greece and 
Luxembourg, for which the information was not available. This gives a potential 
770 observations. The initial truncation date of 1985.1 is determined partly by 
availability of data but mainly because it is difficult to sustain the idea that there is 
a single regime applied over the period as a whole. Prior to 1985 there was 
considerable realignment of exchange rates within the ERM (Exchange Rate 
Mechanism) of the EMS (European Monetary System and in some cases we find 
we cannot use the first two years because the data are incomplete or show 
indications of a regime shift. We also find that there are substantial problems in 
handling the monetary policy reaction function (3.4) across the exchange rate 
crisis of 1992/3. The period since the beginning of 1999 lies within Stage 3 of 
EMU although in practical terms that can probably be dated earlier in 1998. As 
some of these problems lie within individual equations we therefore build up to 
the simultaneous estimation of the entire system of equations by considering the 
four components in turn. While the simultaneous model is deliberately kept 
simple we use some additional information in some of the individual equations to 
explore robustness and some of the variation among the individual countries. 
 
 
4.1  The IS curve 
The model set out in (3.1)–(3.4) above is linear until we apply the threshold 
decomposition explained in (2.1)–(2.3) to it. We begin, therefore, just with the 
problem of aggregation using the linear IS curve (3.1) before adding the 
complication of asymmetry. Parameter estimates (shown in Mayes and Virén 
(2000) Table 4) for the period 1987.1 to 1997.4 for the EU countries (excluding 
Greece and Luxembourg) vary considerably across the individual countries, both 
in terms of lag structures and the values of the coefficients. If we take just the 
impact of a 100 basis point interest rate increase, after allowing for the lag 
structures, the results vary from 0.5 to 3.8 percent of GDP with the bulk of the 
estimates falling in the range 1.0 to 2.2 percent. Thus, if the problem to be 
corrected by policy lay in low response countries in the EU, other, more  
12 
responsive, member states would bear a greater proportion of the adjustment if 
there an equal change in the interest rate across the whole area.
9 
  The same problem of variation in response applies to external influences, 
which are incorporated in the IS curve (3.1) through the real exchange rate with 
respect to the US dollar.
10 The member states react differently to the real 
exchange rate. The significance of this for monetary policy can be judged better 
by considering the ratio of the real interest rate and real exchange rate coefficients 
λ = a3/a4. These ratios range from around 2 to 8 if we ignore the outliers (Figure 1, 
last col.).
11 During 1999 and 2000 the euro depreciated by over 25 percent against 
the dollar. This would imply that the impact on the output gap ranged from the 
equivalent of 300 basis point fall in the real interest rate to around 1200 basis 
points. Using a weighted average (GDP weights) the ratio for the euro area in the 
previous period was around 3.5 (Mayes and Virén (1998) use a variety models to 
establish this value and not just equation (3.1) above). Policy aimed at the area as 
a whole would therefore respond to this average value or rather to its estimated 
value for 1999 and onwards as policy is forward-looking if the ratio were 
computed in this manner. 
  If we assume that the principal parameters in (3.1) are the same across the 
euro countries by treating the data as a panel, we can see (Table 1) that the results 
change and lower estimates for λ are obtained in each case, although not 
strikingly so. This implies that the exchange rate is even more important in the 
monetary transmission mechanism than we previously estimated. The results are 
little changed, although better determined (see the first two cols. in Figure 1), if 
                                       
9 The data period for estimation is prior to the operation of the ECB so using it to draw inferences 
about the operation of monetary policy under Stage 3 of EMU implies some strong assumptions 
about the invariance of behaviour. However, it would require implausibly large changes for the 
problem we illustrate to disappear rapidly. 
10 Other currencies, particularly sterling, play an important role in some countries, so focusing 
purely on the US dollar may be misleading. Indeed in more recent work (Mayes and Virén, 
forthcoming and Table 5, here) we have used the effective real exchange rate. First results suggest 
that the role of the exchange rate in that specification is much stronger than if we restrict it to the 
US dollar. In Mayes and Virén (1998) we also showed that in the case of Finland, where both 
sterling and the Swedish krona account for significant proportions of trade, using a trade-weighted 
index does alter the numerical value of the coefficient noticeably. However, the qualitative impact, 
which is the focus of our discussion here, was small. The Irish Republic is the only country where 
the dollar is clearly not the most important external currency. Similarly over this period, although 
most of the countries were participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System, exchange rates with respect to each other also changed, particularly around 
1992. We show that adding the DM exchange rate adds very little to the overall explanation but 
results in poorly determined coefficients and perverse effects in four cases. 
11 Each column in the figure shows our original estimate of 3.5 for λ for the euro area. The line 
then shows the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimates derived from the various versions 
of (3.1) described in the text.  
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we add the EU countries that are not currently members of the euro area 
(excluding Greece) to the sample (labelled EU13 in Row 5 of Table 1). However, 
when GLS or SUR estimation is applied the estimates become considerably 
smaller still, smaller even than those in Dornbusch et al (1998), and imply an 
implausibly open euro economy. Imposing similarity of behaviour on this 
definition of the EU over this time period would thus tend to generate 
inappropriate conclusions for policy and is clearly rejected by the data.
12 The 
simultaneous estimates for the whole system, Table 8, indicate that satisfactory 
estimates can be obtained for the period 1993–2001 using panel data for the 
EMU10 countries. Rows 2 and 3 of Table 1 indicate that extending this particular 
equation to the whole of our dataset (1985.1–2001.3) suggests a little more 
responsiveness to both interest and exchange rates but SUR estimates give a more 
plausible value for λ. 
  This problem of aggregation under nonlinearity or asymmetry does not 
merely occur when trying to aggregate across different economies. It exists within 
economies as well. To give an indication of the importance of economic structure 
in the estimation of λ we disaggregated Finnish GDP into 8 main sectors, shown 
in Figure 2, and estimated sectoral λs of the same form. As might be expected it is 
the highly traded sectors where λ is lowest: manufacturing, forestry and 
agriculture; and the resident sectors such as construction and hospitality where λ 
is higher.
13 The immediate result is that differences in the relative impact of the 
interest rate and exchange rate channels of the transmission of monetary policy 
vary almost as much by sector as they do by country. Even if country variations in 
λ might be expected to fall as integration proceeds in the euro area, sectoral 
variations are likely to continue. However, increased openness will tend to make 
all sectors increasingly ‘tradeable’ even if their outputs are not readily traded. 
This will tend to lead to decreasing values for λ. At the same time, the 
transmission mechanism through the exchange rate will also be affected by the 
introduction of the euro. Area-wide trends would affect the average λ but it will 
depend upon the correlation between the innovations in the exchange rate and 
interest rate mechanisms in the individual countries as to whether their specific λs 
would fall or rise. 
  The same pattern of industry differences emerges at the European level, as 
can be seen in Table 1 from the estimates of (3.1) at the sectoral level for 
                                       
12 Eika et al(1997) show that there are considerable difficulties in estimating λ from equations of 
the form of (3.1), which help explain why one can get implausible and poorly determined 
coefficients. This is one reason why we explore so many different routes to obtaining estimates of 
λ in Mayes and Virén (2000). 
13 In estimating the differential effect of shocks to the exchange rate on the various parts of the 
euro economy, regard has to be paid not just to the country composition of trade for the each part 
of the area but also to their industrial structure.  
14 
Agriculture, Industry, Construction and Services.
14 The estimated λs follow the 
same pattern as before in order of decreasing openness: agriculture 1.0, industry 
2.2, services 4.7 and construction 18. However, the equation for agriculture is not 
well determined nor is the exchange rate coefficient for construction. Hence if 
shocks are sectoral their impact for monetary policy will be considerably different 
than if they are spread evenly across the whole economy. 
  Thus it matters for policy, not merely whether shocks are unevenly spread 
across the member states of the euro area but whether they are spread unevenly 
across industries. Or turning this argument round, the impact of a common shock 
will vary both by member state and by industry. 
 
 
4.1.1  Asymmetry in the IS curve 
Before proceeding to the estimates of our threshold model, it is worth noting two 
different but well used facets of the term ‘asymmetry’ in the context of the IS 
curve. The first we have already illustrated, namely, that the parameters vary 
across the member states. The second is that there will be systematic departures 
from the simple relationship set out in (3.1) that affect the deepness, steepness and 
length of the business cycle if important relevant variables have been omitted. We 
can show this very simply by augmenting the equation to include two further asset 
prices in addition to interest rates and the exchange rate, namely house prices, hp, 
and stock prices, sp: 
 
, sp hp
yoecd re rr y y
t 1 t 6 1 t 5
1 t 4 1 t 3 2 t 2 1 t 1 0 t
ε + ∆ α + ∆ α +
∇ α + α + α + ∇ α + α = ∇
− −
− − − −  (4.1) 
 
where as before, ∇y = (log) output (GDP at constant market prices) gap, ∇yoecd 
is the OECD (log) output gap, rr = real interest rate (ie nominal 3 month rate 
minus annual inflation in the consumer price index, pc, %) and re = real effective 
exchange rate.
15 Here hp = log of house prices deflated by the consumer price 
index and sp = log of stock prices deflated by the consumer price index. 
  We can motivate this extension readily as one use of the ratio λ has been in 
constructing an index of monetary conditions (MCI). Such an index is thought to 
give an indication of the pressure on the economy from the financial prices most 
                                       
14 It was not possible to get disaggregated data for the period for Belgium or Ireland. Row 4 of 
Table 1 therefore shows the results for the remaining 11 (EU11) countries. The estimates are very 
similar to the other two aggregates of 10 or 13 countries. 
15 In Mayes and Virén (2002) we report results using just the real exchange rate with respect to the 
US dollar. While the sample period and countries included are slightly different the results are 
very similar for variables other than the exchange rate.  
15 
obviously affected by monetary policy, namely interest rates and the exchange 
rate. λ indicates the relative weight to be applied to the two components in the 
index. Other financial variables can be added to list, including long as well as 
short interest rates, stock prices and even house prices (Goodhart and Hofmann, 
2000), if they can be shown to have a distinguishable impact on economic 
activity. In common with other authors (Mayes and Virén, 2002) we also initially 
included a long (10-year) real interest rate but it contributed little to the 
explanation. These more comprehensive indexes are labelled Financial Conditions 
Indexes (FCIs) (see Mayes and Virén (2002) for an explanation). These 
MCIs/FCIs are quite widely used by international organisations such as the 
OECD, IMF and European Commission and by financial analysts. 
  It is immediately apparent that adding house prices and stock prices affects 
the other coefficients and λ (Mayes and Virén, 2002). Some of the impact of 
interest rates appears to be taken up by the house price variable. In the more 
recent estimates shown in Table 2 using the effective exchange rate rather than 
just that with the US, the exchange rate tends to become less important. While 
house prices are clearly an important improvement to the overall specification, 
stock prices (although significant) add relatively little (in common with the 
findings of other authors, Goodhart and Hofmann (2000), Barata and Pacheco 
(2003), for example).
16 The UK probably provides the clearest example of the 
differing components of the FCI, so we illustrate that case in Figure 3. Although 
monetary policy has been quite active in recent years, the short-term real interest 
rate has fluctuated far less that either the exchange rate or stock and house prices. 
Adding in the real exchange rate shows a very different pattern for monetary 
conditions after 1992, with four years of relatively easy conditions followed by 
four years of relatively tight conditions until the easing in 2002. Adding in asset 
prices gives a considerably more volatile picture, despite the low weight on stock 
prices. During 2001 the FCI fell sharply because of the decline in stock market 
values whereas in 2002 the rise in house prices has begun to dominate them 
(Figure 3, second panel).
17 Changes in asset prices on this scale are bound to alter 
the shape of the economic cycle and indeed elicit responses from monetary policy. 
                                       
16 Research at the IMF (Ludwig and Sløk, 2002; Bayoumi and Edison, 2003) shows that the same 
pattern applies more widely across industrialised countries and, outside Japan, has been increasing 
rapidly in the 1990s as a result of upward valuations. The estimates shown in Table 2 allow for the 
possible endogeneity of house prices by joint estimation of house price equation of the form 
∆hpt = β0 + β1∆hpt-1 + β2rrt + β3Yt + β4∆pct + εt with the IS curve using SUR. 
17 Movements in house prices have varied strikingly across the euro area countries in recent years. 
While real house prices rose by around 10 percent a year in Greece, Spain and the Netherlands 
over 1998–2002 they fell in Germany (ECB, 2003). If we extend the period back to 1995, Irish 
house prices rose even faster at nearly 15 percent a year in nominal terms (BIS, 2003). Ranges in 
single years can be even wider, from 1.0 percent in Germany to 17.4 percent in Spain in 2002, for 
example.  
16 
  Asset prices are particularly important (Cechetti et al (2000) for example) in 
the determination of monetary policy as they can introduce substantial 
nonlinearity into the cycle if bubbles develop. The cyclical dynamics through 
asset prices can be augmented by ill-tuned policy with debt deflation (King, 
1994). The Nordic crises around 1990 illustrate these asymmetric dynamics 
graphically, especially in the case of Finland (Mayes et al (2001) inter alia). The 
sharp decline in the economy with a 12% fall in real GDP in just three years was 
in strong contrast to the sustained periods of growth that surrounded it. 
  The problem posed for monetary policy by these ‘asymmetric’ differences 
even in the linear IS curve is magnified when the rest of our model is added. 
Estimating the effect of any particular setting of monetary conditions on 
inflationary pressure in the euro area involves not just the IS curve but the link 
from the output gap through to inflation.
18 If the economic cycles of the Member 
States are not in phase then the individual output gaps will be relevant in assessing 
the likely bite of monetary policy. In such a case it would be inappropriate to 
estimate an MCI using aggregate data for the euro. Instead separate MCIs should 
be estimated at the disaggregated level and then aggregated.
19 This is particularly 
important if the short-run Phillips curve is not linear and positive output gaps have 
a much stronger impact on increasing inflation than negative gaps have on 
decreasing it, as we show in the next section. 
 
 
4.2  The Phillips curve 
While (3.1), although augmented, remains a linear relationship, (3.2), the Phillips 
curve (Phillips, 1958) is the archetypal nonlinear relationship in macroeconomics. 
Indeed it is only partly an accident of history, with the collapse of the long run 
regularity and its replacement with a short-run expectations augmented curve 
(Phelps, 1967) that it has frequently been estimated as a straight line.
20 
                                       
18 It requires at least a ‘Phillips curve’ relating price inflation to the output gap. If the Phillips 
curve uses unemployment as the determining variable then an Okun curve is required as well to 
provide the link between output and (un)employment. 
19 It is not of course self-evident that it is the Member State level that is appropriate for the 
disaggregation. It should really be regions in which behaviour is fairly homogeneous. (Dupasquier 
et al (1997) demonstrate that in some cases there is more variation between some Canadian 
provinces than there is between Canada and the US.) Commodity price shocks may have regional 
rather than national impacts. However, the data to hand are on a Member State basis. 
20 The discussion of the Phillips curve remains contentious. Gordon (1997) maintains that it is 
‘resolutely linear’ in the US while Stiglitz (1994) suggests that it could have the opposite curvature 
with firms being more reluctant to raise rather than lower prices. Yates (1998) offers a helpful 
classification of the main different factors that could lead to nonlinearity. Our concern here is 
mainly to test for the hypothesis of linearity rather than specify the exact form of the nonlinearity.  
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  The form of the ‘Phillips curve’ that lends itself most readily to the 
application of our threshold model is the relationship between the output gap and 
price inflation (see Clark and Laxton (1997) for a brief review and alternative 
approach). Taking a backward-looking approach to expectations, allowing a 
slightly more complex lag structure and replacing unemployment with the output 
gap we can reformulate (3.2) and include the threshold in the form 
 
η + ∇ +
∇ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆
−
+
− − − −
y b
y b m b m b p b p b b p
6
5 2 t 4 1 t 3 2 t 2 1 t 1 0  (4.2) 
 
where ∇y
+ denotes the values of the output gap that exceed a threshold value. 
Accordingly ∇y
– denotes the remaining values of ∇y.
21 Import prices, m, are used 
for the foreign price. 
  Figure 4 shows the results for b5 and b6 for the countries in our sample for the 
period 1985.1–2001.3 using a threshold of zero.
22 It is immediately clear from the 
first three columns of Table 3 that, with the exception of Spain and Finland, the 
results conform to the expected asymmetry whichever estimation method is used. 
GLS and SUR make the picture rather clearer yet do not weaken the overall 
explanatory power. In each case the positive output gap shows a clearly positive 
relationship, while the negative output gap does not appear to exert any significant 
influence on inflation either upwards or downwards. 
  We now have a striking implication for policy. When the output gap is 
negative this will exert very little downward influence in its own right on 
inflation. Attempts to run the economy in an over-expansionary manner will on 
the other hand have substantial and quite rapid effects on inflation. There is 
therefore a strong incentive to avoid inflationary pressures taking hold. With this 
                                       
21 Obviously we could have more that two regimes (facets) for ∇y but since we have only limited 
numbers of observations we use this simple specification (which has been widely used elsewhere, 
see Yates (1998), Department of Treasury (1996) for instance). Corrado and Holly (2003) use a 
three facet curve for the UK and US but they have over double the number of observations. 
Alternatively we could smooth the once-and-for-all regime shift in the threshold model by using 
the so-called smooth transition regression model (STR) (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993), also used 
by Eliasson (1999). The lack of sufficiently long time series also made this alternative less 
appealing. Introducing a quadratic (or indeed a cubic) term in the output gap would also be a 
straightforward way of incorporating nonlinearity. 
22 Estimation of specifications like (2.3) is quite straightforward but testing for the threshold is 
much more complicated, even though we treat the threshold value as a nuisance parameter (see 
Hansen (1999) for details). In particular, in the case of heteroscedasticity, the conventional 
percentage points of the F distribution can be quite misleading. The choice of a zero output gap as 
the point round which to split the data is somewhat arbitrary, although by construction of the 
output gap variable this will be a split around the mean value. A grid search revealed that this 
value was only trivially different from the error minimising result.  
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asymmetric model the costs of pursuing a price level as opposed to an inflation 
target could be considerable. If the actual relationship should be a curve and that 
there is unlikely to be any sharp regime shift around the zero gap then this model 
will tend to underestimate the importance of the output gap for small negative 
values and overestimate it for small positive values.
23 Values nearer the original 
single line will tend to be most appropriate. At large negative and positive gaps 
the mis-estimation will be the other way round. The line will overestimate the 
importance of large negative output gaps and underestimate the importance of 
large positive gaps, possibly exponentially so, depending on the shape of the 
curve, as limits are likely to be approached in both dimensions. 
  Countries with positive output gaps should have a much more important 
influence on monetary policy than those with negative gaps. Or turning the 
argument round, if policy is set symmetrically it will tend to have an inflationary 
bias (see Clark et al (1996) for a clear description). Using the very simplified 
example shown in Fig 5 it is very obvious how ignoring asymmetry and 
aggregation problems could have an unfortunate effect for policy. Assume first of 
all that the relationship between inflation and the output gap is as shown by the 
curve in the figure. Then simple arithmetic aggregation of forecasts of the output 
gap for two countries/regions/industries, which generate two expected outcomes, 
one at A and the other at B, will give a result such as ‘gap’ shown on the 
horizontal axis (even if weights are used). Assuming the relationship is a straight 
line will result in forecast inflation being ∆p1 rather than the appropriate value 
∆p2. Under an inflation targeting regime this will tend to mean that the policy 
response will be rather harsher under the assumption of a linear relationship than 
it should be. Indeed in the case illustrated, the correct policy decision would be to 
ease while the actual decision, wrongly assuming linearity, would be to tighten. 
  We have chosen the deliberately simplified case where both A and B are on 
the linear as well as the curvilinear relationships. In general the contribution of 
large negative output gaps to holding inflation down will be overestimated and the 
contribution of high positive gaps to driving inflation up will be under estimated. 
However, this is assuming that there is a common relationship, which applies all 
of the euro economies. There is considerable evidence that there are important 
differences in the transmission mechanism across the member states. Thus it is 
                                       
23 Pyyhtiä (1999) using a similar model but with fewer countries and semi-annual data (without 
lags) obtains similar results for the pooled model. When the individual countries are estimated 
separately the pattern of the coefficients is similar in all cases, with positive gaps having a greater 
effect than negative gaps. Only in the case of Germany does the coefficient for the negative gap 
approach significance but the positive gap coefficients are not particularly strong except in the 
case of Italy. However, Pyyhtiä’s main focus is on a curvilinear specification, using a quadratic 
representation of the output gap. Adding the quadratic term improves the explanation for 5 out of 
the 7 countries in the sample but the findings are relatively weak even in the pooled case. Mayes 
and Virén (2000) also show examples of more explicitly curvilinear relations.  
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necessary to add not just results from different points on a nonlinear relationship 
but from different nonlinear relations. We thus need to consider where each of the 
countries is on its own curve and add together the change in inflation that would 
stem from the impact of the single monetary policy on each country’s output gap 
and then aggregate.
24 
  From a practical policy point of view the use of a single linear relationship 
will only generate significant errors, if 
 
–  the shifts along the curves are expected to be substantial 
–  the nonlinearity is considerable
25 
–  the different countries have very different output gaps (their cycles are not 
well coordinated) 
–  the individual country relationships are very different from each other. 
We explore these issues in more detail with the full model in Section 5. 
  Equation (3.2) expresses the Phillips curve in the more traditional form with 
unemployment rather than the output gap indicating the degree of demand 
pressure on inflation. While this specification provides a similar explanation of 
inflation the Wald tests shown in Table 3 indicate that there is little nonlinearity in 
the role of unemployment.
26 Nevertheless the two coefficients bear the expected 
relation to each other as in the normal Phillips curve. Unemployment that is above 
the Hodrik-Prescott trend has a weaker effect on inflation than unemployment 
when it is below it. We show in Table 8 for the complete model that this result 
depends somewhat on the exact data period chosen. Restricting the estimates to 
the period since the 1992 ERM crisis results in clearly different unemployment 
coefficients for the two regimes but with unemployment still having a weakly 
significant negative effect on inflation even when it is above trend. Yates (1998) 
also has problems with detecting a lower bound in the way we observed with the 
output gap. 
                                       
24 This is simplistic because the component economies interact, see Virén (2001) for example. 
25 De Grauwe and Sénégas (2003) show that even if the Phillips curves are linear then it will be 
more accurate if the monetary authority reacts by estimating national responses and aggregating 
rather than using simply the area-wide relationships – a result which is amplified in the presence of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty on its own is a reason for nonlinear policy responses (Meyer et al, 2001). 
Initial deviations from target could be tolerated on the grounds that they might represent changes 
in behaviour. Large deviations on the other hand would be obviously inconsistent, whatever 
behavioural changes might have occurred, and warrant a robust response. 
26 The signs are of course reversed in this case compared to the output gap. Fabiani and Morgan 
(2003) estimate Phillips curves with this format for the five largest euro area members, they 
consider aggregate and pooled estimates for the unemployment gap coefficient. While they find 
that the individual countries differ particularly in lag structures they do not explore asymmetry and 





4.2.1  The problem at the regional and sectoral level 
The problem for aggregation from asymmetry and nonlinearity applies to some 
extent at whatever spatial level we choose to measure activity. Indeed regional 
data within countries will help show the extent of structural change and the degree 
of mismatch in behaviour across sectors and the economy. We therefore test the 
hypothesis that the greater the range/variance of regional unemployment at any 
given level of average unemployment then the more inflationary will be the 
impact, as the low unemployment regions will contribute to inflationary pressure 
for the EU as a whole.
27 The variance of unemployment acts as a measure of the 
mismatch across the EU. However, it has also been argued that it is the pool of 
suitably qualified unemployed in the areas of the main demand for labour that are 
most important in determining inflation. Those with less relevant qualifications or 
unable to take a job offer quickly will be less relevant, thus generating an 
asymmetric departure from the simple Phillips curve. 
  The effect of the range of regional unemployment on inflation may be even 
more extreme. For the case of the UK Buxton and Mayes (1986) showed that the 
region with the lowest unemployment (the South East) had a highly 
disproportionate impact on wage inflation for the country as a whole. More than 
that it appeared to be short-term unemployment that had the effect. Those 
employed for a year or more appeared to be effectively out of the labour market 
from the point of view of affecting the inflationary process. 
  The regional data available for the EU do not allow us simply to re-estimate 
the same formulation of the Phillips curve at a more detailed level. Most 
importantly the data are annual and relate to unemployment rather than the output 
gap. However, by using annual data it is no longer necessary to transform (3.2) 
and we can estimate it directly including a measure of forward-looking 
expectations 
 
t a Udisp a U a m a p a p a p 6 5 4 3 1 t 2
e
1 + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ −  (4.3) 
                                       
27 This can be regarded as an extension to the Lilien index (Lilien, 1982; Mayes and Silverstone, 
1998) L = √[Σiwi(ei – E)
2], where ei is the rate of growth of employment in region or sector i and E 
is the growth of employment in the area as a whole, wi being the weight, the share of employment 
in that region in the total. Lilien’s hypothesis is that the greater the dispersion of growth rates in 
employment the higher is likely to be the unemployment rate. This reflects the idea that it is costly 
to retrain or move labour. Purely macroeconomic statistics will cover up the consequences of this. 
If growth is not evenly spread then the more rapidly growing regions will not be as successful in 




The forward-looking estimate of ∆p
e uses the forecasts that the OECD publishes 
annually for the year ahead.
28 Udisp, the variance of unemployment levels across 
each country has been included in two forms: the range, Umax-Umin, to capture 
any effect from the extremes, and the standard deviation, Usd.
29 The Eurostat 
Regio database at the NUTS3 level for the EU has some 251 regions for our 
subset of countries.
30 The data are annual for the years 1984–1998 but not all 
years are available for each country so we only obtain some 153 observations out 
of the potential 180. 
  We can see from Table 4 that the hypothesis is borne out whichever of the 
two unemployment variance measures is used. Variance in unemployment across 
regions has a positive effect on inflation. It is also clear from the comparison of 
columns 1 and 3 and 2 and 4 that the individual member states react differently. 
Inserting shift dummies into the equation improves the fit of the basic Phillips 
curve considerably, increasing the (negative) impact of average unemployment 
substantially while also increasing both the size and the significance of the 
positive impact of the spread. 
  In column 6 of Table 4 we try adding the asymmetry in the Phillips curve 
itself by replacing the single (linear) relationship with the two-piece threshold 
model. In this case the parameter (a4) varies according to whether unemployment 
is above or below a threshold value. As there is no obvious a priori value for the 
threshold, we use Maximum Likelihood to estimate the threshold and the 
parameters of (4.3) jointly. This gives a value of 10.8% for the threshold, 
somewhat higher than the average value of unemployment of 8% for the 
estimation period. The difference in the two unemployment coefficients is not 
substantial but it is significant at the 1% level. The results follow the expected 
convexity with the effect of unemployment on inflation being greater at lower 
levels of unemployment and weaker at higher levels.
31 
                                       
28 Although picking on any one forecaster is inherently arbitrary we have used the OECD for three 
main reasons. Firstly, because the OECD uses a common methodology for each country there is a 
degree of coherence across the different countries in our sample. Secondly, although subject to 
political pressures the OECD view is likely to be fairly widely shared and respected. Lastly, 
because a formal methodology is employed there is likely to be some coherence over time. 
29 We have not attempted to include further variables to remove the effect of specific shocks such 
as oil price rises but there is a strong downward trend in inflation in many countries over the 
period, which needs to be accounted for in the relationship is to be meaningful. We are grateful to 
a referee for suggesting we might include a measure of the third moment of unemployment to 
reflect asymmetry directly. 
30 The Irish Republic also had to be excluded through lack of data. 
31 We do not attempt to explain this threshold as some sort of NAIRU or natural rate, which is in 
any case normally thought to vary over time. We this avoid the debate in Karanassou et al (2003) 
about whether there is any such concept for a sample of European data that overlaps ours.  
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  We can however follow up the issue of sectoral disaggregation of the Phillips 
curve by using the same sectoral data that we used for the IS curves in Table 1. 
We estimate (4.2) with the output gaps computed for each of the sectors 
individually rather than for the whole economy.
32 For all four sectors the impact 
on inflation is higher when there is a positive output gap (see the last four rows of 
Table 5). In each case the positive segment coefficient is clearly significantly 
different from zero. In the case of agriculture and construction the impact is 
relatively limited. The negative segment coefficients are close to zero and poorly 
determined, with the exception of services where there is a moderate affect. The 
sectoral distribution of any excess supply thus has an effect on the overall 
outcome. Since shocks have differential effects across sectors we would expect 
this to have differential effects on inflation and hence on monetary policy. 
  Clearly to quite some extent this is illustrating what we know already as these 
asymmetric impacts would be picked up by other aspects of macroeconomic 
models. Sectoral shocks would have differing effects on the exchange rate or 
import prices for example. Nevertheless these results make it clear that neglecting 
the distribution of the impact below the EU level could have misleading 
implications for policy, whether the neglect was national, regional or sectoral. 
Even within smaller countries the distributional differences still matter. 
  Our results seem to be a little more robust to the finding of asymmetry and 
nonlinearity than some other recent studies. In their work on asymmetry and 
nonlinearity in the Phillips curve, Laxton et al
33 find that while the evidence 
supports the existence of convex relationships between inflation and 
unemployment in an expectations augmented specification, the convexity is not 
strong over the policy relevant range and the evidence relatively weak.
34 Indeed 
they conclude (Laxton et al 1999, p. 1482) ‘standard empirical techniques are not 
likely to be capable of providing a reliable answer on the functional form’. 
However, in no case is the convex relationship rejected by the data.  They use 
both the regime change model we employ and a continuous curve and consider 
the US, UK and Canadian economies. McDonald (1997) and Razzak (1997) find 
similar relationships for the Australian and New Zealand economies. 
  Inside the euro area the convexity will have a particular effect if the various 
member states are out of phase in their economic cycle or have been subject to 
asymmetric shocks that require structural adjustment that may be slow to come if 
there is substantial hysteresis in the economy. The economies that are suffering a 
negative output gap will be doing less to bring inflation down than the economies 
with the positive output gaps are providing upward pressure. Therefore in general 
                                       
32 Inflation also relates to the sectoral prices. 
33 Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993); Laxton, Meredith and Rose (1995); Clark, Laxton and Rose 
(1996); Debelle and Laxton (1997); Clark and Laxton (1997); Laxton, Rose and Timbakis (1999). 
34 The authors use both piecewise linear and curvilinear specifications.  
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the more asynchronous the euro area turns out to be the tighter monetary policy 
will need to be compared with any given growth rate for the area as a whole. If 
cycles are asymmetric in the sense that it tends to be more difficult to get out of 




4.3  The Okun curve 
The discussion of the Phillips curve dealt both with asymmetry from the labour 
market and asymmetry from excess demand. The Okun curve (3.3) in our model 
provides a link between output growth and unemployment and gives us a rather 
more satisfactory opportunity to distinguish the two sources of asymmetry. The 
Okun curve has been subject to quite extensive analysis in recent years
36 and 
Silverstone and Harris (1999) find asymmetry of some form for Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, the UK, US and West Germany over the period 1978 to 1999. 
However, the finding is not universal and they cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
symmetry for Canada over the same period. Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) 
introduce sector specific factors to help explain the lack of symmetry. 
  Following Laxton et al (1999) and Pyyhtiä (1999) we apply our threshold 
model to (3.3) in terms of output growth 
 
t 1 4 3 2 1 0 c pop c ) ( y c ) ( y c c U η + ε + ∆ + τ ∆ + τ ∆ + = ∆ −
− +  (4.4) 
 
using an error correction format. Here ∆y is the growth rate in GDP, pop the 
population of working age and ε the error correction term (lagged one period) and 
τ a threshold value for the asymmetry. Prachowny (1993) inter alia argues that 
some scaling of the labour variable in (3.3) is required so we include population 
of working age in our formulation. 
  As we noted in Section 2 there are two alternative ways of incorporating the 
asymmetry. The first, following Kim and Nelson (1999), using the Friedman 
(1993) ‘plucking’ model, is to assume that although the function itself is linear, 
we should treat potential output more in the form of a frontier, very much along 
the lines of frontier production functions (Aigner et al, 1977; Mayes et al, 1994; 
Mayes, 1996). This provides a direct extension to Prachowny’s (1993) production 
                                       
35 The Phillips curve is also asymmetric in a different sense in the Ball (1993) Mayes and Chapple 
(1995) discussion of the ‘sacrifice ratio’. Here the gains in terms of extra output when the output 
gap is positive are more than offset by the losses when a negative output gap has to open to return 
inflation to its previous level.  In this case the relationship is not merely a curve but its shape 
depends upon whether the output gap is falling or rising. 
36 Attfield and Silverstone, 1998; Harris and Silverstone, 1999; Kaufman, 1988; Moosa, 1997, 
Palley, 1993, Prachowny, 1993 and Weber, 1995, for example.  
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function basis for the Okun curve. Here the errors in the relationship can be 
decomposed into a symmetric term e and a non-symmetric term v, which permits 
a longer tail of values when the economy is operating inside the frontier.
37 
  Our results, reported in Table 6, show estimates of (4.4) for the EEA countries 
from 1961 to 1997.
38 Only in the case of the UK do we find that there seems to be 
little relation between output and unemployment when using a linear formulation. 
Once we introduce the asymmetry, most countries produce the positive and 
negative segments with different slopes and show the expected asymmetry very 
clearly. If we separate out the data according to whether or not the economy is in 
recession
39, columns 1 and 2 in Table 6, in 12 of the 16 cases the coefficients are 
larger when the growth rate is negative. In other words unemployment rises more 
when the economy contracts than it falls when the economy expands. This fits 
with our expectations about hysteresis. However the differences are not in general 
significant. Of the four cases that do not conform to this pattern, Finland shows no 
asymmetry, while Greece and Italy have perversely signed coefficients for the 
negative segment. However, in each case the likelihood ratio test does not lead us 
to reject the symmetric relationship. Symmetry is also rejected in the case of the 
UK but here the negative segment also has a perverse coefficient. 
  If on the other hand we split the relationship at the point which maximises the 
likelihood function then only three cases show coefficients where the effect on 
unemployment is smaller (less negative) below the threshold (columns 3 and 4 in 
the Table). Italy and Finland now follow the majority but Spain now shows 
perversity.
40 Only in the case of the UK was the coefficient for the negative 
segment significantly different from zero at the 5% level and here the threshold 
value, at –0.53%, was very much out of line with the rest of the sample. Most 
thresholds lay in the range 2.3 to 4.3% and all cases the restriction that the two 
                                       
37 Thus in the case of (3.3) the error term η in the estimated version of (3.3) would be composed 
η = v + e, with e ~ N (0, 
2
e σ ) and v ~ M (µ, 
2
v σ ) where M is a nonsymmetric distribution. Kim 
and Nelson (1999) assume that M is half Normal, Mayes et al (1994) also consider the more 
general case of a truncated normal. 
38 We have used both a longer data series and a wider range of countries than Harris and 
Silverstone (1999). While we did experiment with a split error correction term it appeared that 
incorporating the asymmetry into the coefficients of the equation was a rather better determined 
approach. Different speeds of adjustment alone had lower explanatory power and added little when 
the output coefficient split was already present. In part this may be due simply to the use of annual 
rather than quarterly data. For an application of the model to 21 OECD countries see Mayes and 
Virén (2000). 
39 Ie if GDP falls. 
40 We were unable to produce estimates for Germany because of the overwhelming effect of 
unification.  
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GDP coefficients be equal was rejected.
41 When we apply the model to our 
quarterly panel data (Table 7), using an HP trend to try to take account of the 
longer-run path in unemployment over the sample seems to be the least favourable 
to the nonlinearity hypothesis (columns 4–6), while using a constant (columns  
1–3) gives the strongest support. The finding of nonlinearity is clearly dependent 
on model specification, variable transformation and the sample period chosen. As 
Table 8 illustrates for the full model, nonlinearity is present after 1992. While we 
have by no means explored every possibility there appears to be enough evidence 
to take the hypothesis of nonlinearity very seriously. 
  Use of these aggregate models in some senses only provides a description of 
the stylised facts and not an explanation of why the asymmetry may be occurring. 
This becomes clearer at the disaggregated level. In discussing regional 
disaggregation of the Phillips curve we suggested that it was the tightest labour 
markets that contributed to inflation and hence that we needed to consider the 
spread of unemployment across markets and not just its level in order to 
understand the nature of the problem. In the case of the Okun curve Haltiwanger 
and Schuh (1999) demonstrate that it is necessary to understand the dynamics of 
the labour market at the plant level to get an appreciation of asymmetry. They 
show that a further term should be added to our formulation of the Okun curve, 
which reflects the degree of ‘job reallocation’
42 both within and between sectors. 
For all of the five different measures they use there is a clearly significantly 
positive effect on unemployment from increased rates of job reallocation. 
However, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) go even further and estimate 
determinants of job reallocation. Here not surprisingly it is downturns in the 
overall economy that help, including the lagged influence of monetary policy. 
Relative price shocks also provide an explanation, so supply as well as demand 
shocks have a role to play. The problem also shows considerable persistence. 
Thus in downturns unemployment is more than symmetrically large than in 
upturns and takes longer to fall than it did to rise. 
  One important explanation of asymmetry that we do not capture is the role of 
labour market institutions, particularly the trade unions. They may readily respond 
much more vigorously to the threat of job losses than they do to increases. The 
actions they can take are also somewhat asymmetric. There is no clear upside 
equivalent to withdrawing labour. 
 
 
                                       
41 Harris and Silverstone (1999) also encounter the problem of perversity but only on a limited 
scale and for a partly different group of countries. However their estimates are well determined. 
42 We describe this as ‘churning’ in Mayes (1996).  
26 
4.4 Monetary  policy 
One of the difficulties about measuring the three foregoing relationships is that in 
practice the observations that we have are ‘policy inclusive’. Over the period 
governments have sought to stabilise the economic cycle with some combination 
of monetary and fiscal policy, partly through ‘automatic stabilisers’ and partly 
through discretionary action on each occasion. Laxton et al (1993) argue that this 
will tend to reduce our ability to observe the curvature of the relationship. Not 
only does it inhibit the variance but it reduces the impact of the underlying 
relation. However, the impact of policy could be even more distorting if policy is 
itself not symmetric or linear. Economists typically express loss functions in 
quadratic terms implying that policy will respond more than proportionately as 
expected outcomes deviate from their targets. However, they tend to make them 
symmetric (Taylor, 1993). It is perhaps a little more realistic to consider the 
‘opportunistic’ approach to policy (Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002) where 
‘favourable’ outcomes, such as more rapid recoveries, balance of payments 
improvements etc, than expected are accepted and not offset, whereas less 
favourable outcomes stimulate further policy responses.
43 A more general 
asymmetric loss function is used in Koskela and Virén (1990) and Virén (1993) 
drawing on the work of Waud (1970) and Hosomatsu (1970). This also applies the 
threshold model approach that we have used in this paper. However, here we 
experiment by introducing a policy reaction function directly into the model. 
  It is difficult to decide on a form for the monetary policy reaction function as 
the EU countries were following different regimes during the period. The 
Bundesbank used a form of enhanced money targeting (Issing et al, 2001), many 
of the other central banks were targeting the exchange rate within the ERM, while 
others including the UK, Sweden, Finland and Spain had periods of inflation 
targeting. However, as Collins and Siklos (2002) demonstrate, a simple Taylor 
Rule of the form of (3.4) where interest rate smoothing is included provides a 
reasonable representation of the behaviour of most modern regimes including the 
US, despite the fact that their ostensible objectives are different. It even embraces 
the ‘speed limit’ interpretation of US policy (Walsh, 2001, Woodford, 1999), 
although for some small open economies it might make sense to include the 
exchange rate. What is particularly interesting is that even though monetary policy 
is firmly forward-looking in the eyes of central banks including forecasts of 
inflation and the output gap in (3.4) do not alter the performance markedly. The 
position can change somewhat if the rule itself is forward-looking and targets 
                                       
43 Monetary authorities may seek to offset the asymmetries in the inflationary process, while 
governments may be more concerned to combat high unemployment or take advantage of periods 
of higher growth (the ‘inflation bias’ discussed clearly in Walsh (1995) inter alia).  
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forecast inflation as in Svensson (1997), Schaling (2002) and Corrado and Holly 
(2003). 
  In view of the high level of endogeneity we only estimated the reaction 
function as part of the whole system (see the last three rows of coefficients in 
Table 8). It is immediately apparent that the results are dependent on the data 
period chosen. The problem lies with the breakdown of the ERM in 1992. If 
estimation is restricted to the post 1992 period (columns 5 and 6) then we observe 
the expected result. The weight on inflation is about twice that on the output gap 
and there is a large element of smoothing in policy. If 1992 is included in the data 
period then the weights are equal. 
  However, these results involve a symmetric reaction function. It is clear from 
Table 9 that the reaction function is itself asymmetric. The authorities appear to 
have responded more vigorously when inflation has been above 2 percent a year 
than when it is below it.
44 This asymmetry also seems to apply to the output gap. 
The interest rate response has been clearly stronger when output has been above 
trend than when it was below it. 
  We wondered whether this asymmetry was in fact somewhat misleading as 
the Eurosystem’s target for price stability is for inflation not exceeding 2 percent 
over the medium term. Thus, if this were followed we would expect to see 
disproportionate reactions to inflation above 2 percent and to deflation. Rather 
than impose our own view of where the different regimes should lie we searched 
for the maximum likelihood estimates for rounded intervals. Here it appears that 
deflation is tackled even more vigorously than inflation above the target range 
(Table 10). The lowest weight is for inflation in the range zero to 4 percent a year. 
This somewhat wider range for milder action than that implied by the Eurosystem 
target is probably accounted for by the fact that most of the data period is before 
the ECB was set up. A similar set of results is obtained for the output gap, with 
larger coefficients outside a corridor 2 percent either side of zero. However, it was 
not possible to obtain significant coefficients for the output gap above the 
corridor. Indeed trying to include the output gap poses considerable convergence 
                                       
44 Shown at the quarterly rate of 0.005 in the Table.  
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problems for the model.
45 This result compares well with the approach of Corrado 
and Holly (2003) who show not merely that the Phillips curve can be 
approximated by a three piece function, similar in concept to this corridor 
approach, but that a three piece feedback rule for monetary policy provides an 
appropriate characterisation for policy. Here again, responses are greatest above 





5 The  joint  effect 
Taking the Phillips curve, Okun curve, IS curve and monetary reaction function 
results together gives us a somewhat better insight into the nature and causes of 
both asymmetry and nonlinearity in macroeconomic behaviour. Although, of 
course, some of the picture is clearly still omitted. It is clear that the variations 
across regions in labour markets and across sectors in product markets lead to 
important deviations in aggregate behaviour. When combined with the different 
national and sectoral responses to monetary policy, whether through the exchange 
rate or interest rates, this permits substantial departures from linearity. The 
asymmetries in the Phillips curve that we have explored appear to be primarily 
cyclical in character. The asymmetries in the Okun curve, on the other hand are 
                                       
45 We have undertaken some limited experiments in estimating ‘corridor’ Taylor rules with 
monthly data for the 15 EU member states, which show similar results. Responses to output gaps 
of less than 2% are weaker and generally of low significance in the period 1993.1–1998.12. 
Responses to output gaps above the corridor were however stronger than to those below it but in 
both cases the results were clearly significant at the 1% level. The inflation target could be 
represented by the German inflation rate. Within the 2% difference corridor, responses were not 
significantly different from zero, while outside it they were, with upside inflation having a 
coefficient three times as large as that for the downside. Monthly models create severe problems 
not just for data but with the timing of monetary policy decisions. At a monthly level there is clear 
inertia in decision-making, which is not so evident from quarterly data. There is a clear 
relationship between the number of policy rate changes in a given year and both the inflation 
differential with Germany and the size of the output gap. Thus the larger the gaps, the more policy 
rate changes are required to close them. 
46 Gerlach (2000a) explores the idea that policy makers are asymmetric in their concerns over 
positive and negative output gaps. He suggests that there is evidence from the period 1960–1979 in 
the US that the Federal Reserve reacted more strongly to negative than positive output gaps 
(thereby giving an inflationary bias to policy). Surico (2002) suggests that this asymmetry has 
become sharper since 1979, particularly with respect to the output gap – the policy preference for 
inflation puts a higher weight on correcting inflation when it is above the target rather than below, 
thus tending to offset the output gap asymmetry. (Since Surico’s responses are quadratic, bigger 
deviations receive a more than proportionate response than do small ones.) Gerlach and Smets 
(1999) provides one of the best known assessments across the euro area.  
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more complex, reflecting not just cyclical factors but the degree of sectoral and 
regional mismatch in the operation of the labour market. There is thus not just a 
nonlinear underlying relationship but asymmetric departures from it. As the 
average level of unemployment falls so the scope for regional and sectoral 
disparities also falls, as there is a lower bound. It seems likely therefore that there 
is more than one source of asymmetry. The structural mismatch in the labour 
market appears to be an additional cause to the traditional Phillips curve result. 
  The asymmetries are likely to interact. The asymmetric nominal rigidities 
implicit in the Phillips curve are likely to contribute to the asymmetric labour 
demand effects revealed in the Okun curve. Downward rigidities in prices and 
wages would tend to increase the variance of unemployment. The different 
sectoral responses to monetary policy will be a reflection of this. Asymmetric 
shocks will interact with the nonlinear responses and asymmetric processes 
themselves. When combined with the policy reaction this generates a considerable 
identification problem (as explained by Blinder and Solow (1973) in the case of 
fiscal policy and Haldane and Quah (1999) for monetary policy). 
  We therefore estimate the four equations (3.1), (4.4), (4.2) and (3.4) as a 
system using SUR for the period 1985Q1 to 2001Q3. The estimates of the 
coefficients from the individual equations are stacked in that order in Table 8. 
Columns 1, 3 and 5 use the deviation of unemployment from its Hodrik-Prescott 
filtered trend in the Phillips curve, while the other three columns show the results 
for the output gap. The results are similar to those obtained when estimating the 
equations separately. The asymmetry appears to be concentrated in the Phillips 
curve (asymmetry due to unemployment dispersion in the Okun curve could not 
be included with these quarterly data) when using this full sample. However, if we 
confine the estimation to the period after the ERM crisis (columns 5 and 6) then 
there is asymmetry in the Okun curve as well. Including the years when the euro 
area was in operation does not appear to have a major effect. We have used rolling 
regressions to test for other sources of instability. We therefore proceed with the 
1993–2001 estimates as being more informative about recent and likely future 
behaviour in the euro area. 
  There are various ways in which we could shock the system to illustrate the 
effects of asymmetry. In Figure 6 we show the impact of a one percentage point 
shock in OECD GDP, applied in 1995 to the model in column 6 of Table 8, on 
unemployment and the price level. The solid line shows the linear version of the 
model and the dotted line the asymmetric version. Initially there is little impact on 
the path of unemployment, although inflation rises more slowly under the 
asymmetric model during the first two years. The pattern then changes for the rate 
of inflation, which thereafter is higher and after three years the price level itself is 
higher. Unemployment shows the more striking movement as there is a clear 
regime shift after 10 quarters. The simulation is data dependent and at this point 
the output gap crosses the threshold. There is some variation in the date of the  
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switch for various countries. Germany for example only sees unemployment fall 
by two thirds of the average, with a more adverse effect on prices that does not 
involve lower inflation at any stage in the asymmetric case. Finland on the other 
hand is very similar to the average. 
  Our model is only illustrative and we can increase the effects by using larger 
shocks, altering their timing to affect when the regime switches or adding the 
asymmetric version of the reaction function. If instead of using the panel data 
model we were to allow different parameter values for each individual country, as 
explored in Section 3, then we would observe a much bigger variety of timing and 
size of regime shifts even under a single monetary policy reaction function. 
  Our analysis does not offer much scope for a discussion of the causes of 
asymmetry. In their tests of causes of asymmetry in the Phillips curve Dupasquier 
and Ricketts (1998) are able to isolate some evidence for the hypotheses of costly 
adjustment, capacity constraints and misperception (of aggregate and relative 
price shocks). The nominal wage resistance hypothesis was not obviously 
sustained, a result consistent with Yates (1998). Although to some extent these 
causes should be separable, the results from their joint inclusion were not well 
determined. Eliasson’s (1999) finding that the Phillips curve, using 
unemployment not an output gap as the determining variable, shows different 
sources of nonlinearity in Sweden and Australia is also helpful. In the Swedish 
case it is the rate of change of inflation expectations that is important, while for 
Australia it is the rate of change of unemployment.
47 The former case will have 
particularly important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover 
the fact that the sources of nonlinearity differ for these two countries and are not 
found in the case of the US, in contrast to Laxton et al (1997), emphasises the 
potential problem of aggregation that we have outlined for the euro area. 
  We have only explored some forms of asymmetry across the cycle. Lo and 
Piger (2002) offer a more complex analysis by using a regime-switching model 
for the US, which does not seek to explain why the regime changes but just the 
nature of the asymmetries. They find that policy actions are more likely to lead 
output changes in a downturn than an upturn and that large or contractionary 
policy actions are more likely to lead output changes than those that are small or 
expansionary. Unfortunately the problems of adjusting to policy under EMU will 
be long in the past before there is an equivalent 45 years of quarterly data to use in 
similar estimation for the European countries. 
 
 
                                       
47 Buxton and Mayes (1986) also made this finding for the importance of the rate of change of 
unemployment in the case of the UK.  
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6 Conclusion 
We have argued that there are clear asymmetries in the relationship between 
demand pressure, inflation and employment in the European union and the euro 
area in particular. These asymmetries exist at the sectoral and regional levels as 
well. As a result, using arithmetic weights to add effects across countries in order 
to determine area wide monetary policy could produce erroneous results.
48 This is 
exacerbated by the fact that there is considerable variation across the EU countries 
in their responses. It therefore matters which part of the area is experiencing 
which shocks. Average values can be misleading. However, if business cycles 
among the EU countries are becoming relatively co-ordinated, as Artis et al 
(1999) indicate, then the problem is reduced.
49 Differences in the speed and extent 
of the transition mechanism within countries will matter rather than differences 
according to where they are in the cycle as well. The problem still will not 
disappear if the shock falls on countries such as Spain where the impact of 
disinflationary policy is slower and milder than elsewhere. 
  Much of the literature on asymmetry in EMU is misconceived for our 
purposes as it focuses on the idea that individual countries will vote for the policy 
that would be best suited to their own needs and that the compromise or majority 
position may be suboptimal.
50 Our implicit assumption is that all those deciding 
on monetary policy are trying to so from the point of view of what is best for the 
euro area as a whole.
51 Our concern is simply that if arithmetic weights are used in 
a nonlinear and asymmetric world there is a danger of generating inefficient 
outcomes.
52 
  We primarily focus on asymmetries stemming from the behaviour of the 
labour market.
53 Rapid downturns in the economy appear to have more than 
proportionate downward effects on unemployment, partly because of mismatch 
                                       
48 The ECB uses both area-wide and multi-country models (Fagan et al, 2001) so this problem can 
be addressed. 
49 However, Artis et al (1999) also find discrepancies in behaviour between recoveries and 
recessions. For example, Spain has a weak and slow response to recessionary forces compared to 
its partners but a stronger one than the average with respect to booms. 
50 Alesina and Grilli (1992) were among the first to discuss how policy might actually be decided 
and a substantial literature has developed along these lines. 
51 We therefore do not have to face any problems about whether policy is based on the median 
voter or the nature of qualified or other majorities. 
52 Tarkka (1998) has already shown that inappropriate voting systems could make the result even 
worse. 
53 Most explanations of asymmetries in the business cycle focus on the labour market, however, 
Chetty and Heckman (1986) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) suggest that exit from industries 
may be less costly than entry. Mayes (1986) suggests that this applies to exit and entry from 
markets as well, particularly where this involves foreign trade.  
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between the sectors and regions where the jobs and unemployed lie. This effect is 
likely to be greater in the EU, where labour mobility is lower, than in the US 
where the phenomenon is already clear. A slower response to adverse shocks 
makes recovery phases longer and unemployment persistent. 
  However, these forms of asymmetry have a rather different impact on the 
inflationary process. The straightforward asymmetry, inherent in the convexity of 
the Phillips curve, is that excess demand in product or labour markets has a 
significant upward effect on inflation while deficient demand has little or no effect 
on lowering inflation. The process is however more complex as the dynamics 
suggest that big differences between sectors and regions distort the picture. It is 
the existence of tightness in parts of the labour market that affects overall inflation 
and average unemployment and, by analogy, probably tightness in sectors of the 
product market that tends to intensify the inflationary pressure. Thus our findings 
indicate that, in each example we have considered, ignoring the disaggregated 
problem will tend to result in misleading policy conclusions. 
  The asymmetry is not restricted to demand shocks, as supply shocks, 
particularly through the exchange rate and foreign sector, can have sharply 
differing impacts both across the member states of the EU and across the sectors 
of industry. The traditional implication for policy, set out in Laxton et al (1995), is 
that monetary policy will need to be set somewhat more restrictively than is 
implied by linear symmetric models. However, it is also likely that any ‘new 
economy’ effects, where faster non-inflationary and higher unemployment growth 
develops, may occur in the areas of high demand and relative labour shortage 
(Oliner and Sichel, 2000). Hence the implications of the asymmetric effects, 
observed in data from the past may need to be rethought if major sectors in the 
economy are undergoing structural change in their responsiveness and flexibility. 
  None of this argument implies that running a single monetary policy is 
inappropriate. However it does have two other major implications. First, it implies 
that in setting monetary policy the Eurosystem needs to take account of the 
problems of asymmetry and aggregation. Second, it entails that the governments 
of the member states both individually and jointly need to consider what other 
policy changes are needed in order to offset the blunt nature of the impact of 
monetary policy. Structural and fiscal policies can be far better tuned to have 
detailed impacts on parts of the economy. These interventions may take the form 
of changing labour market arrangements or altering the structure of financial 
contracts so as to affect the real impact of monetary policy. The ‘open method of 
co-ordination’ facilitates this form of policy learning in the EU. This second 
message is not new and is not the focus of this paper. Our concern is to highlight 
the first implication, that for the setting of monetary policy. 
  However, it would be mistaken to assume that the effects will be wholly 
negative in terms of reducing the bite of monetary policy at low levels of inflation 
or negative output gaps.  Much of the point of EMU is to change macroeconomic  
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behaviour for the better in the member states. The more rapidly developing 
economies will be facing looser monetary policy than would have been the case 
without the union (except for countries that were closely targeting the DM, where 
there will be rather less change).
54 We can expect, for example, that the countries 
with the positive output gaps will in fact try to hold down prices more than they 
would previously out of fear that their competitive position would worsen now 
that they have no independent exchange rate to offset the worsening in inflation. 
Indeed there are signs in both Finland and Ireland, which have been growing 
rather faster than the rest of the euro area that recent growth-inflation 
combinations have become more favourable (Mayes and Suvanto, 2002). In other 
words that the sustainable rate of growth has increased and that calculations of the 
output gap need to be revised (downwards). 
  It is, however, problematic to infer from this evidence that the response of the 
authorities to these observed asymmetries should itself be asymmetric in order to 
compensate. Past policy is part of the adjustment process and hence its results are 
incorporated in the estimated relations, especially those of a strongly reduced-
form nature. Asymmetries in policy may themselves have contributed to the 
observed asymmetries over the course of the cycle. Haldane and Quah (1999) note 
that the aggressive policy response to inflation in recent years may make the 
short-run Phillips curve look near horizontal. Our estimates of a monetary reaction 
function for the euro as part of the model suggest that policy has indeed been 
asymmetric. However it is not simply that the authorities have reacted more 
strongly to high rather than low inflation but that they have reacted more strongly 
still to deflation. Thus what we see is a ‘corridor’ pattern, where within the 
corridor the response is relatively mild and outside the response is much more 
aggressive. Given that the Eurosystem has adopted a target range for inflation 
over the medium term and not a single midpoint value, this corridor may turn out 
to be a better description of future policy than some simple linear reaction 
function. The more aggressive approach to the threat of deflation may reflect the 
‘zero bound’ problem. As nominal interest rates approach zero traditional 
monetary policy reaches its limit and recourse has to be made to other measures 
that affect the exchange rate, other asset prices and the rate of inflation. The wish 
to avoid entering this difficult zone coupled with the real costs of deflation may 
help explain the vigour of the pre-emptive response. 
  Some of the asymmetry will be in omitted parts of the economic system, the 
most obvious of which is counter-cyclical fiscal policy. In a companion paper 
(Mayes and Virén, 2003) we show, using annual data for all the EU countries 
                                       
54 Although Germany is the largest economy in the euro area and several other economies are 
closely integrated with it, euro monetary policy will itself deviate from what the Bundesbank 
would have done as the Bundesbank would not have taken into account the consequences for the 
rest of the area.  
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except Luxembourg over the years 1960–1999, that while the automatic stabilisers 
tend to be fairly symmetric across the growth and contraction phases of the cycle, 
discretionary fiscal policy has not. The asymmetry applies rather more to revenues 
than to expenditures and appears to relate to a tendency to cut tax rates more in 
the growth phase than is sustainable over the cycle as a whole. There is some 
matching failure to restrain expenditures in the upswing compared to the 
downswing.  Although there has been a trend towards symmetry, the suspension 
of the operation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2003 shows that these 
pressures still apply. Monetary policy has to handle the consequences. One feature 
of ECB pronouncements has been warnings on the need to respect the 
requirements of the SGP. This again would reinforce the 'corridor' finding as 
fiscal policy has been more controversial towards the extremes of the cycle with 
case of Ireland in the up phase and Portugal, France and Germany in the down 
phase.  
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Table 1.   Estimates of an IS curve with panel data 
      for the EU 
 
  ∇y–1  re–2 rr–2  ∇yoecd–1 R
2/SEE/DW  λ/period 
EMU10 .833  .012 –.039  .334 .781/.699/2.06  3.3 
 (26.76)  (3.47) (2.43)  (4.36)   Short 
EMU10:GLS .801  .055 –.096  .138 .722/.066/1.88  1.7 
 (33.61)  (4.48) (1.96)  (4.31)   Long 
EMU10:SUR .764  .029 –.112  .155 .720/.066/1.81  3.9 
 (31.95)  (1.77) (2.10)  (3.84)   Long 
EU11 .823  .014 –.037  .250 .759/.727/2.17  2.6 
 (25.98)  (4.04) (3.14)  (3.29)   Short 
EU13 .812  .012 –.039  .301 .760/.721/2.04  3.3 
 (29.37)  (3.85) (3.58)  (4.45)   Short 
EU13:GLS .838  .012 –.023  .273 .803/.718/2.08  1.9 
 (40.57)  (4.81) (2.18)  (5.04)   Short 
EU13:SUR .812  .011 –.012  .265 .757/.725/2.02  1.1 
 (35.70)  (4.28) (1.34)  (4.28)   Short 
Agriculture .347  .010 –.010  .649 .152/4.532/1.77  1.0 
 (3.90)  (0.42) (0.13)  (1.32)   Short 
Industry .701  .026 –.056  .643 .658/1.444/2.17  2.2 
 (19.08)  (3.78) (2.25)  (4.37)   Short 
Construction .671  .005 –.089  1.017 .525/2.785/2.35  18 
 (11.55)  (0.40) (1.52)  (3.39)   Short 
Services .828  .006 –.028  .191 .703/.670/2.25  4.7 
 (24.80)  (1.80) (1.66)  (2.69)   Short 
All estimates are OLS unless stated otherwise. The dependent variable ∇yt, is the output 
gap constructed from the HP filter. rr is the real interest rate, re the real exchange rate 
with respect to the US dollar and ∇y oecd the output gap for OECD GDP. The pooled 
cross-country data consist of observations for 1987.1–1997.4 for the ‘Short’ sample and 
1985.1–2001.3 for the ‘Long’ sample. In the Long sample the interest rate is lagged an 
extra quarter. GLS denotes Generalised Least Squares estimates, which use cross section 
weights to account for (cross-section) heteroscedasticity. SUR denotes Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression estimates. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. The 
number of observations is 442 for EMU 10, 484 for EU 11 and 576 for EU 13 for the 
Short sample and 725 for the Long sample. With sectoral data, the number of 
observations is 483. The set of countries in this case is: Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
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Table 2.   Estimates of the expanded IS curve 
      with panel cross-country data 
 




























2   .679   .159 
100*see   .77   .86 
DW   2.06   1.99 
period 1985.1–2003.1 
N/obs 13/712 
      Variables are as defined in the text, y is log GDP, ∇y is the 
log output gap, Y–1 denotes the lagged output variable and 
Yoecd, the output variable for the OECD as a whole, both 
defined compatibly depending upon whether the output 
variable is the output gap or the change in output as 
indicated by the column headings. N denotes the number of 
countries and obs the total number of observations in the 
regression. 
        Model is estimated by SUR jointly with a second equation 
of the form ∆hpt = β0 + β1∆hpt–1 + β2rrt + β3Yt + β4∆pct + εt. 
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Table 3.   Phillips curve estimates from panel data 
 
 OLS  GLS SUR OLS GLS  SUR 











































































2  .373 .373 .373 .365 .363 .355 
SEE  .006 .006 .006 .006 .006 .006 
DW  1.967 2.027 1.907 2.042 2.012 1.935 













Def. of ∇x  ∇y  ∇y ∇y ∇u ∇u  ∇u 
p denotes consumer prices, m import prices, ∇y the HP output gap for GDP, ∇u is the 
deviation of unemployment from the mean level of unemployment over the sample. The 
data period stretches from 1985.1 to 2001.3. t values in parentheses using 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Wald test for equality of coefficients on ∇x
– 
and ∇x
+ p-value in parenthesis. 
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Table 4.   Estimates of the Phillips curve 
      with regional EU data 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆p
e  .655 .649 .513 .488 .522 
 (12.42)  (10.17) (12.72) (11.77) (13.76) 
∆p–1  .254 .214 .191 .143 .567 .187 
 (5.72)  (3.92) (5.26) (3.66) (23.89) (5.31) 
∆m  .058 .056 .063 .068 .085 .065 
 (6.56)  (5.43) (10.14) (9.25) (13.19) (10.54) 
U –.053  –.003 –256 –248 –290 –306/–.260 
 (3.36)  (0.23) (10.06) (12.84) (11.82) (11.66/12.00) 
Umax-Umin .068  .147 .154 .130 
 (4.81)  (6.47) (6.86) (5.91) 
Usd   .103 .192  
   (2.32) (2.93)  
t –.016  –.001 –.112 –.108 –.112 –.110 
 (1.82)  (0.45) (10.06) (9.05) (9.25) (10.57) 
R
2 .868  .866 .914 .918 .885 .918 
SEE .963  1.073 .816 .878 .938 .797 
DW 1.526  1.289 1.800 1.590 1.928 1.822 
Dummies No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 153  143 153 143 153 153 
All estimates are SUR estimates. ∆p
e denotes expected inflation (OECD forecasts), m 
import price inflation, ∆p is inflation in consumption prices, U the aggregate 
unemployment rate, Umax-Umin the range of regional unemployment rates, Usd the 
corresponding standard deviation and t time trend. Column (6) is estimated using a 
threshold model specification and allowing the coefficient of the unemployment rate to 
vary depending on whether the rate is below (first coefficient) or above (second 
coefficient) the 10.8% threshold. The hypothesis that the coefficients are equal can be 




Table 5.   Estimates of sectoral phillips curves 
 




   F(∇y
-=∇y
+) 
GDP  .288 .259 .064 .017 .027 .090 .580/336/2.00 
  (8.30) (7.26) (6.81) (1.97) (1.31) (4.25) .000 
a  .284 .274 .060 .016 .005 .020 .570/.543/1.93 
  (8.04) (7.56) (6.21) (1.81) (1.09) (3.36) .027 
i 271 .261  .056 .014 –.005 .067 .576/340/1.30 
  (6.66) (5.70) (5.71) (1.59) (0.38) (4.30) .002 
c  .293 .258 .060 .009 _.010 .031 .590/332/1.93 
  (8.08) (7.07) (6.08) (2.03) (1.34) (3.91) .002 
S  .285 .269 .067 .018 .047 .077 .575/.539/1.98 
  (8.17) (7.56) (7.09) (2.08) (1.79) (3.09) .005 
p denotes consumer prices, m import prices and ∇y the HP output gap for GDP, 
agriculture, industry, construction, services (a/i/c/s). F(∇y
– = ∇y
+) denotes probability of 
the F test statistics for the hypothesis that the coefficients of ∇y
– and ∇y
+ are equal. The 
data cover the period 1987:1–1998:4 only. The threshold is ∇y = 0. t values in 
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Numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios ∆y
+(0) and ∆y
–(0) denote estimates with zero 
threshold and ∆y
+(c) and ∆y
–(c) estimates with nonzero (estimated) threshold value. The 





a3∆popt + a4εt–1 + ηt, where u denotes the (log) number of unemployed, y the growth rate 
of output, pop the (log) working-age population, ε an error-correction term in terms of u, 
pop and time trend and η the error term. F is the F(1,31) test for the equality of the 
coefficients of ∆y
+ and ∆y
– in the case of nonzero threshold. Estimates are based on 




Table 7.   Okun curve estimates from panel data 
 



















































R2 .990  .990 .990 .823 .822  .8722 
SEE  .427 .427 .430 .344 .347 .346 
DW  1.600 1.586 1.555 1.979 2.024 2.011 













Dep.var. u  u u ∇u ∇u  ∇u 
Dependent variable U is either the unemployment rate u or the corresponding HP 
residual ∇u. ∇y
–(∇y
+) denotes the negative (positive) values of HP residuals in 







Table 8.   Simultaneous system estimation for all four 
      equations from panel data 
 





















































































































































































































































period 1985–2001  1985–2001 1985–1998 1985–1998 1993–2001  1993–2001 
def. of x  ∇u  ∇y  ∇u ∇y ∇u  ∇y  
λ  5.70 6.02 4.42 4.70 3.86  3.85 
Wald b1 = b2  2.32 (.128)  2.31 (.124) 2.66 (.103) 2.88 (.089) 30.28 (.000)  .27.90 (.000) 
Wald c5 = c6  2.74 (.098)  17.92 (.000) 0.74 (.389) 13.13 (.003) 11.54 (.001)  25.34 (.000) 
y0, u0 and p0 denote the constant terms of IS, Okun and Phillips curves, respectively. In 
the Taylor rule (last three rows of estimates), the intercept r0 was allowed to vary from 
country to country. Number of observations 720.  
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∆pt|∆pt < .005  .281*
 (2.30)




∇yt|∇yt < 0  .112*
 (2.65)
∇yt|∇yt > 0  .381
 (5.72)
      The Wald test result for the equality of the two 
respective coefficients is 927 (.009), Thus, the linear 
model is rejected at the 1 per cent significance level 
with the chi-square distribution. All estimates are 
derived form the whole system of equations. Data 
period is 1993–2001. 
 
 
Table 10.  Corridor reaction functions 
 
∆pt|∆pt < 0  .602
 (3.63)
∆pt|0 < ∆pt < .01  .153
 (3.32)
∆pt|∆pt > .01  .230
 (6.60)
∇yt|∇yt < –.02  .249
 (9.32)
∇yt|–02 < ∇yt < –.02  .074
 (3.80)
∇yt|∇yt > .02  .147
 (0.41)




Figure 1.  Confidence intervals for estimates of λ 
     (short  sample) 
 
EU10 = EMU countries in the sample, EU13 = EU countries, SC = single countries, LS = 









EU10.LS  EU10:GLS  EU10:SUR  EU13:LS EU13:GLS EU13:SUR SC:LS  SC:SUR   
 
 
Figure 2.  Values of λ for different sectors in Finland 
 























Figure 3.  Illustration of the difference between the real 
      interest rate (rr), the monetary conditions index 
      and the financial conditions index (FCI) for the UK 













      RR= real interest rate 
      MCI = weighted average of the real interest rates and the 
real exchange rate (using estimated panel data weights) 
      FCI = weighted average of rr, re and ∆hp (using estimated 
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Figure 4.  Estimates of simple nonlinear Phillips curve 






Figure 5.  Linearity and nonlinearity in the Phillips curve 















Figure 6.  Impact of a one percentage point increase 
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